







Rousseauian Heritage of Rawls’s Moral Psychology
Abstract
Some authors have noticed Rousseau’s influence on Rawls’s original position argument for 
justice as fairness, but few have argued for Rousseau’s influence on his moral psychology, 
which constitutes the first part of his stability argument. I will argue that Rawls’s account 
of moral development parallels, and is grounded in, Rousseau’s thoughts on amour-propre. 
In particular, I argue that (1) Rawls’s thesis that the sense of justice is derived from love 
and friendship is an illustration of Rousseau’s thesis that moral sentiments are derived 
from natural sentiments, that (2) Rawls’s explanation for how we acquire the reciprocity of 
disposition is grounded in Rousseau’s explanation of how amour-propre can be extended 
into the sense of justice, and that (3) Rawls’s thoughts on the principle of sympathy parallel 
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More  generally,  the  reciprocity  thesis  says  that  those who  receive benefits 
from others tend to benefit others. This reciprocity thesis originated in Rous-
seau but is developed by Rawls. In “The Sense of Justice” and Chapter VIII 
of A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains how the reciprocity of disposition is 
exhibited in each of the three stages of moral development. In Restatement, 
he  re-emphasises  the  importance  of  the  acquisition  of  the  sense  of  justice 
through the three stages of moral development and argues that the reciproc-
ity of disposition is an essential element in his reasonable moral psychology. 
Thus,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  Rawls’s moral  psychology  has  a 
Rousseauian interpretation.












1. Rawls’s Moral Psychology
Rawls says that his moral psychology is a psychological reconstruction which 


























of  justice so  that  they generally comply with  those  institutions” (PL 141).6 
The second question is whether the political conception of justice can be the 
focus of an overlapping consensus. He argues  that  the  first question  is an-
swered by his account of moral development in Theory. The second question 
is answered by the fact that the political conception of justice is acceptable 
for all  reasonable comprehensive views. In Restatement,  in response  to  the 
objection that the consensus is utopian, he argues that it is a reasonable moral 
psychology, which includes the reciprocity of disposition that is exhibited in 
each stage of moral development  (JF 196).7 Thus,  even  though  the  role of 























This  thesis  is explicit  in Emile where Rous-
seau says: “Our first duties are to ourselves: 
our primary sentiments are centered on our-
selves;  all  our  natural  movements  relate  in 
the first instance to our preservation and our 
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ment. His  three-stage development of  the morality of principles  is  initially 
stated in “The Sense of Justice” and Chapter VIII of Theory. The origin of 













a  sense of  self-confidence, which affirms  their  self-esteem; and  fourth,  the 
child has  tightened bonds with and deep affection  for  their parents as  they 
connect them with their self-development and self-esteem. The child’s return-






























































the  principles  of  justice,  they will  have  a  sense  of  guilt,  “principle  guilt”, 



















moral  concept  and  its  associated  principles. 









parents’ manifest  love  and  the  development 
of  their own intellectual skills. The sense of 
self-respect  inclines  them  to  respect  others 
and recognize them as equals.
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the sense of  justice  is derived from love and friendship.  In other words,  to 
acquire the sense of justice in the final stage, a person must love their parents 

















2.  The Parallel Relations Between Rousseau’s Concept 










Rawls  acknowledges  that  his  moral  psychology  is  an  illustration  of  how 






































































John Deigh, The Sources of Moral Agency: 
Essays in Moral Psychology and Freudian 













































































comply with  the  two principles of  justice once  they recognize  that  the  just 
institutions are beneficial to them and those around them. It is important to 
note that the reciprocity of disposition is acquired for the first time when the 




















love. Human beings naturally have self-love, and  they naturally  love  those 
who manifestly love them. Love is extended from themselves to those around 
them  (provided  that  they  love  them with  evident  intention).  Parental  love 













































cal  feature  of amour-propre,  but  also Rawls’s  explanation  of  how  citizens 




2.3. A Realistic Moral Psychology
Rawls suggests that justice as fairness has a more realistic moral psychology 
than other  conceptions of  justice,  such  as utilitarianism, perfectionism and 
intuitionism. The flaw of intuitionism is that it fails to describe the sense of 













propre.  In particular, Rousseau argues  that amour-propre,  rather  than com-
passion,  is  the  primary motivating  force  for  human  actions.  In  the  second 
Discourse, Rousseau suggests that even though amour de soi and compassion 
are  the  two principles of action  in  the state of nature, amour de soi,  rather 
than compassion,  is  the primary motivating  force. He also  says  that  in  the 
civil state, compassion is too weak to motivate a person to act compared with 
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Prichard  says  that  “suppose  that  reliable 
methods  were  developed  for  determining 









infanticide or  by  sending  them  to  less well-
ordered  societies),  this  would  seem  to  be 
consistent with  principles  of  reciprocity,  as-
suming the newborns had made no significant 
contribution to the society”. – M. S. Pritchard, 




on  the  other  hand,  he  might  say  that  even 
though they cannot make contribution to the 









fails  to  understand  why  the  reciprocity  of  disposition  will  generate  equal 
mutual respect. He thinks that the principle of reciprocity is the morality of 
exchange. On  this  reading,  since  those who are disabled do not  contribute 















justice, provided  that  they have  feelings of  love and  friendship  in  the  first 
two stages. Their sense of justice is not toward those they love and befriend, 






But perhaps Pritchard’s question  is how  those who have a  sense of  justice 
may have equal respect with those who cannot contribute to the cooperative 










it will  provide  support  for Piaget’s  and Kohlberg’s  empirical  psychologies 













3. Conclusion and Some After-Thoughts
To  conclude,  I  have  argued  that  there  is  a  Rousseauian  interpretation  of 
Rawls’s moral psychology which constitutes the first part of his stability argu-
ment and that on this interpretation, some of the objections against his moral 














bleness.  In making  an  analogy  between Rousseau  and Rawls’s moral  psy-








Rousseauovsko nasljeđe u Rawlsovoj psihologiji morala
Sažetak
Rousseauov utjecaj na Rawlsov izvoran argument za pravdu kao poštenje neki su autori primije­
tili, ali malo je njih raspravljalo o Rousseauovu utjecaju na Rawlsovu psihologiju morala koja 
sačinjava prvi dio njegova argumenta o stabilnosti. Argumentirat ću da Rawlsov iskaz o moral-
nom razvoju podudara i zasniva se na Rousseauovu konceptu amour-propre. Napose tvrdim da je 
(1) Rawlsova teza da osjećaj za pravdu proizlazi iz ljubavi i prijateljstva prikaz Rousseauove teze 
da moralni sentimenti proizlaze iz prirodnih sentimenata, da se (2) Rawlsovo objašnjenje o tome 
kako zadobivamo reciprocitet dispozicija zasniva na Rousseauovu objašnjenju kako amour-propre 
može biti produžen u smisao pravde, te da (3) Rawlsova misao o principu simpatije odgovara 




Rousseausches Erbe in Rawls’ Moralpsychologie
Zusammenfassung
Rousseaus Einflussnahme auf Rawls’ ursprüngliches Argument für Gerechtigkeit als Fairness 
wurde zwar von einigen Autoren bemerkt, jedoch nur wenige haben sich für Rousseaus Einfluss 





ausmacht. Ich werde substanziieren, dass Rawls’ Bericht über die moralische Entwicklung mit 
Rousseaus Gedanken über die amour-propre übereinstimmt und darauf aufbaut. Insbesonde-
re argumentiere ich, dass (1) Rawls’ These, der Sinn für Gerechtigkeit rühre von Liebe und 
Freundschaft her, eine Illustration von Rousseaus These ist, dass moralische Empfindungen auf 
natürlichen Empfindungen beruhen, dass (2) Rawls’ Auslegung, wie wir die Reziprozität der 
Disposition erlangen, auf Rousseaus Erklärung basiert, wie amour-propre auf den Gerechtig-
keitssinn ausgedehnt werden kann und dass (3) Rawls’ Gedanken zum Prinzip der Sympathie mit 




Le patrimoine de Rousseau dans la psychologie morale de Rawls
Résume
Certains auteurs ont remarqué l’influence de Rousseau sur l’argument de la position originelle 
de Rawls en faveur de la justice comme équité, mais peu ont argumenté en faveur de l’influence 
de Rousseau sur sa psychologie morale, qui constitue la première partie de son argument de la 
stabilité. Je soutiendrai que le compte­rendu de Rawls sur le développement moral est un paral-
lèle et il se fonde sur les réflexions de Rousseau sur l’amour-propre. En particulier, je soutiens 
que (1) la thèse de Rawls selon laquelle le sens de la justice procède de l’amour et de l’amitié 
est une illustration de la thèse de Rousseau selon laquelle les sentiments moraux procèdent de 
sentiments naturels, que (2) l’explication de Rawls sur la manière d’acquérir la réciprocité des 
dispositions est fondée sur l’explication de Rousseau sur la manière dont l’amour-propre peut 
être étendu au sens de la justice et que (3) les réflexions de Rawls sur le principe de sympathie 
correspondent aux pensées de Rousseau sur la compassion.
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